Phasic dopamine as a prediction error of intrinsic and extrinsic reinforcement driving both action acquisition and reward maximization: A simulated robotic study by Mirolli, Marco et al.
Phasic dopamine as a prediction error of intrinsic and
extrinsic reinforcements driving both action acquisition
and reward maximization: A simulated robotic study
Marco Mirollia,⇤, Vieri G. Santuccia,b, Gianluca Baldassarrea
aIstituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione (ISTC), CNR
Via San Martino della Battaglia 44, 00185, Roma, Italia
bSchool of Computing and Mathematics, University of Plymouth
Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom
Abstract
An important issue of recent neuroscientific research is to understand the
functional role of the phasic release of dopamine in the striatum, and in par-
ticular its relation to reinforcement learning. The literature is split between
two alternative hypotheses: one considers phasic dopamine as a reward pre-
diction error similar to the computational TD-error, whose function is to
guide an animal to maximize future rewards; the other holds that phasic
dopamine is a sensory prediction error signal that lets the animal discover
and acquire novel actions. In this paper we propose an original hypothesis
that integrates these two contrasting positions: according to our view phasic
dopamine represents a TD-like reinforcement prediction error learning sig-
nal determined by both unexpected changes in the environment (temporary,
intrinsic reinforcements) and biological rewards (permanent, extrinsic rein-
forcements). Accordingly, dopamine plays the functional role of driving both
the discovery and acquisition of novel actions and the maximization of future
rewards. To validate our hypothesis we perform a series of experiments with
a simulated robotic system that has to learn di↵erent skills in order to get
rewards. We compare di↵erent versions of the system in which we vary the
composition of the learning signal. The results show that only the system
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reinforced by both extrinsic and intrinsic reinforcements is able to reach high
performance in su ciently complex conditions.
Keywords: Phasic dopamine, reinforcement learning, intrinsic motivation,
TD learning, actor critic, computational model
1. Introduction
The neuromodulator dopamine (DA) has long been recognized to play a
fundamental role in motivational control and reinforcement learning pro-
cesses (Wise and Rompre, 1989; Robbins and Everitt, 1992; Wise, 2004;
Schultz, 2006; Berridge, 2007). The main sources of dopamine in the brain
are the dopaminergic neurons of the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc)
and the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA), which release dopamine in a number
of cortical and subcortical areas, including the pre-frontal cortex, the stria-
tum, the hippocampus, and the amygdala (Bjorklund and Dunnett, 2007).
Two modes of dopamine release have been identified: a tonic mode, in which
dopaminergic neurons maintain a steady activation for prolonged periods of
time, and a phasic mode, in which the firing rates of dopaminergic neurons
sharply increase for 100-500 ms (Grace et al., 2007; Schultz, 2007). An im-
portant issue of recent neuroscientific research on dopamine is to understand
the functional role of the phasic release of dopamine in the striatum, and in
particular its relation to reinforcement learning.
1.1. Dopamine as a reward prediction error
Single neurons recording have clearly demonstrated that most dopamine
neurons are activated by the rewarding characteristics of somatosensory, vi-
sual, and auditory stimuli (Schultz, 1998). In particular, most dopaminergic
neurons show phasic activations in response to unpredicted rewards (Romo
and Schultz, 1990). If the reward is preceded by a conditioned stimulus that
reliably predict it, activations of dopaminergic neurons do not occur at the
time of reward, but at the time of the (unpredicted) reward-predicting stim-
ulus (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz et al., 1993). Furthermore, dopamine
neurones are phasically depressed when a predicted reward, or even a pre-
dicted reward-predicting stimulus, is omitted (Ljungberg et al., 1991; Schultz
et al., 1993).
These characteristics of the phasic activation of dopamine neurons closely
match the properties of the Temporal-Di↵erence (TD) error postulated by
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the computational theory of Reinforcement Learning (Barto et al., 1983;
Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto, 1998). The TD-error ( ) is an error in the
prediction of future rewards calculated on the basis of the reward itself (R)
and the di↵erence in two consecutive predictions (P ):
 t = Rt +  P t   P t 1
where   (ranging in [0, 1]) is a discount factor.
The TD error has been introduced as a learning signal that can drive
an agent to learn to maximize the sum of acquired rewards. In particular,
the TD learning algorithm is able to solve the problem of temporal credit
assignment. An agent that receives rewards only as a result of a sequence
of actions must learn which are the specific actions that contribute to the
achievement of the reward. TD learning solves this problem through the use
of predictions: using the TD error as the learning signal instead of the simple
reward, all those actions that bring the agent closer to the reward (i.e. in
states in which the prediction of discounted future rewards is higher) will be
reinforced.
The recognition that phasic dopamine behaves like the TD error signal
led to the hypothesis that phasic dopamine plays in real animals the same
functional role that the TD error signal plays in artificial agents: accord-
ing to this hypothesis dopamine is a reward prediction error learning signal
that drives the agent in learning to deploy its actions in order to maximize
rewards (Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997). In accordance with this
hypothesis, dopamine is known to modulate the plasticity of cortico-striatal
synapses (Reynolds et al., 2001; Reynolds and Wickens, 2002; Calabresi et al.,
2007; Wickens, 2009), and dopamine release in the striatum has been recently
shown to be both necessary and su cient for appetitive instrumental condi-
tioning (Robinson et al., 2006; Zweifel et al., 2009). The reward prediction
error hypothesis of phasic dopamine has so far received a large amount of em-
pirical support (e.g. Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Waelti et al., 2001; Tobler
et al., 2005; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Daw et al., 2005; Fiorillo et al., 2008),
and is currently a widely accepted tenet of contemporary neuroscience (e.g.
Schultz, 2002; Suri, 2002; Montague et al., 2004; Ungless, 2004; Wise, 2004;
Sugrue et al., 2005; Salzman et al., 2005; Frank, 2005; Doya, 2007; Graybiel,
2008; Glimcher, 2011).
However, the reward prediction error hypothesis has an important limit:
it ignores the well known fact that phasic DA is triggered not only by reward-
related stimuli, but also by other phasic, unexpected stimuli (Chiodo et al.,
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1980; Steinfels et al., 1983; Strecker and Jacobs, 1985; Ljungberg et al., 1992;
Horvitz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Horvitz, 2000; Dommett et al., 2005).
Since these activations occur in presence of stimuli that have never been
associated with reward, it is not clear how the dopamine-as-TD-error hy-
pothesis might account for them.
1.2. Novelty bonuses
A possible explanation of the dopaminergic responses to unexpected events
within the computational reinforcement learning framework has been pro-
posed by Kakade and Dayan (2002), who linked those responses to the prob-
lem of exploration (see also Fellous and Suri, 2003). A reinforcement learning
agent must not focus on what it has already learned; rather, it needs to keep
exploring its environment so to discover new, possibly more e cient, ways
to get rewards. In the reinforcement learning literature a possible way to
do this is by making reinforcements (Sutton, 1990; Dayan and Sejnowski,
1996), or reinforcement predictions (Ng et al., 1999), depend not only on
bare rewards but also on other signals, called bonuses. Hence, according to
Kakade and Dayan, the dopaminergic responses to unexpected events might
be explained by assuming that animals are reinforced not only by biological
rewards but also by the novelty of perceived states: such novelty bonuses
would have the function of increasing the animal’s tendency to explore, thus
possibly improving the maximization of rewards.
The exploration bonuses hypothesis presents two problems: first, bonuses
are given as a function of the novelty of the perceived states, whereas phasic
dopamine activations have been recorded in response to unexpected events
(i.e. unpredicted changes of state), like the switching on of a light (irre-
spective of whether the light is novel or familiar); second, according to this
proposal, the adaptive function of novelty bonuses is a general increase in
exploration, whereas there is ample evidence that unpredicted events can
be used as reinforcers for learning new instrumental actions (see, e.g. Kish,
1955; Williams and Lowe, 1972; Glow and Winefield, 1978; Reed et al., 1996,
see also Fiore et al., 2008 for a computational model. For a more detailed
discussion on these points, see section 5 below).
1.3. Dopamine as a sensory prediction error
Redgrave and colleagues have long been criticizing the reward prediction
error hypothesis of phasic dopamine (Redgrave et al., 1999) and have recently
proposed an interesting alternative hypothesis (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006;
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Redgrave et al., 2008, 2011, 2012). This hypothesis distinguishes between
two separate sub-processes underlying instrumental conditioning: 1) action
discovery and learning (i.e. learning which changes in the environment are
caused by the animal and which are the sequences of movements that sys-
tematically produce those changes) and 2) learning which action to deploy
in a given context so to maximize the acquisition of biological rewards. Most
computational models of reinforcement learning, in particular those on which
the dopamine as reward prediction error hypothesis is based, assume that the
system has already a repertoire of actions (thus ignoring problem 1) and are
focused on problem 2.
According to Redgrave and colleagues, the phasic dopaminergic signal is
not suitable for solving problem 2 (reward maximization) for at least two rea-
sons: first, it is triggered also by unexpected events not related to rewards;
second, its latency is too short for the signal to encode the biological value
of the detected event, as required by the reward-prediction error hypothesis
(in particular, the latency is shorter than that of saccadic eye movements,
meaning that dopamine is released before the animal has the time to turn
and see the value of the appeared stimulus). On the contrary, they propose
that the dopaminergic signal is ideal for solving problem 1, that is action
discovery and acquisition: a pre-saccadic signal is what is needed for rein-
forcing those actions that have been produced just before the unexpected
event and that might have contributed to cause it (Redgrave and Gurney,
2006; Redgrave et al., 2008). Hence, according to Redgrave and colleagues
phasic dopamine is a sensory prediction error signal that drives action dis-
covery and acquisition, rather than a reward prediction error driving reward
maximization. According to this hypothesis, reward maximization is not due
to the reinforcement of cortico-striatal connections in the basal ganglia, but
to the reward-related modulation of stimuli representations in the sensory
areas that send input to the striatum: it is this modulation of reward-related
stimuli, due to yet-unknown dopamine-independent mechanisms, that can
favor the selection of reward-maximizing behaviors (Redgrave et al., 2011,
2012).
We consider the distinction between the two sub-problems of instrumen-
tal conditioning very useful, and the arguments according to which phasic
dopamine is particularly well suited for solving the problem of action dis-
covery and acquisition as compelling. However, the arguments related to
the second problem, according to which learning how to deploy actions for
maximizing rewards does not depend on dopamine but on stimulus modu-
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lation, su↵er of two important flaws. First, the main argument against the
reward-prediction-error hypothesis, according to which dopamine is too fast
for encoding stimulus value, is just contradicted by facts: phasic dopamine
has been repeatedly and consistently shown to behave like a reward predic-
tion error, encoding both the value and the probability of predicted rewards
(e.g. Morris et al., 2004; Tobler et al., 2005; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Fio-
rillo et al., 2008). By fostering new empirical research, the argumentations
of Redgrave and colleagues can help in discovering how this is possible (e.g.
May et al., 2009), but cannot disprove that it is true. Second, the mechanism
proposed by Redgrave and colleagues for driving reward maximization, i.e.
the modulation of stimulus representation by reward, is neither su cient nor
necessary to do the job. It is not su cient because stimulus modulation may
at most help the animal to focus its attention to the stimuli that are related
to reward, but it cannot, by itself, tell the animal which action to perform on
those stimuli: in order to maximize reward in instrumental tasks changing
representations of stimuli is not enough; you need to change the probability
of performing a specific action given a specific stimulus (hence, if action se-
lection is performed in the striato-cortical loops, as Redgrave and colleagues
suggest, to change cortico-striatal synapses). Moreover, the modulation of
stimulus representation is not even logically necessary to maximize future
rewards since the mechanism suggested for action discovery and learning,
i.e. dopamine-dependent synaptic plasticity in cortico-striatal synapses, is
all that is needed also for reward maximization. If one accepts, as empiri-
cal research suggests and as Redgrave and colleagues do, that (a) dopamine
do reinforces actions, and (b) dopamine never habituates when rewards are
involved, rewards maximization follows. Indeed, the large amount of evi-
dence regarding the similarity between phasic dopamine and the TD-error
signal demonstrates just this: phasic dopamine is the ideal learning signal
for learning to maximize future rewards.
1.4. Summary and overview
In summary, the neuroscientific literature on the functional role of phasic
dopamine is split between two main hypotheses. According to the predomi-
nant view, phasic dopamine is a reward prediction error learning signal whose
function is to train an animal to maximize future rewards. On this view,
the triggering of phasic dopamine by unexpected events is either ignored or
treated as novelty bonuses with the function of fostering exploration. Accord-
ing to the second view, phasic dopamine is a sensory prediction error learning
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signal whose function is to let an animal discover which events it can cause
and how (i.e. to drive action acquisition). On this view, learning how to
deploy acquired actions in order to maximize rewards depends on processes
that do not happen in the striatum and do not depend on dopamine.
In this paper we propose a new hypothesis on the adaptive function of
phasic dopamine which integrates these two opposing positions (section 2).
We also validate our hypothesis through a series of experiments performed
on a simulated robotic system that have to autonomously acquire a series of
skills in order to maximize its rewards (sections 3 and 4). In particular, we
compare the performance of the system with di↵erent compositions of the
learning signal and show that the system that implements our hypothesis is
the only one that is able to learn to maximize rewards in su ciently complex
conditions. We conclude (section 5) by discussing our hypothesis with respect
to both the neuroscientific and the computational literature on reinforcement
learning.
2. Dopamine reconciled: reinforcement prediction error for action
acquisition and reward maximization
Our hypothesis is that phasic dopamine represents a reinforcement pre-
diction error learning signal analogous to the computational TD error, in a
system where both biological rewards and unexpected changes in the envi-
ronment act as reinforcers. The function of such a signal is to drive both
the discovery and acquisition of novel actions and the learning of how to
deploy actions in order to maximize future rewards. Phasic dopamine is
able to play both roles just because it is triggered by the aforementioned
two di↵erent kinds of reinforcers. In particular, unexpected events consti-
tute “temporary” reinforcers whose function is driving action discovery and
acquisition, whereas biological rewards are “permanent” reinforcers whose
principal function is to drive reward maximization.
The reinforcements provided by unexpected events are “temporary” in
the sense that they change during an organism’s lifetime: as events become
predictable, they fade away. This is the reason they are particularly well
suited to drive action acquisition. As an unpredicted event is detected, phasic
dopamine is released, reinforcing (through dopamine-dependent learning in
the striatum) the behaviours produced just before the detection of the event.
As the organism repeats those behaviours with some modification (e.g. due to
noise), sometimes the event will re-occur (thus reinforcing behaviours) while
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other times it will not (thus suppressing them). This mechanism should make
the animal converge on just those components of its motor output that are
required for systematically producing the event. As this happens, the event
becomes predictable for the animal, and thus stops to trigger dopamine. In
this way, the agent has acquired a new action, i.e. a sequence of motor
commands that systematically produce a specific change in the environment.
Since the production of that action ceases to be reinforced, the animal will
stop to trigger it, unless the outcome of the action becomes valuable because
it turns out to be part of a chain of actions that leads to reward.
The reinforcements produced by biological rewards are “permanent” in
the sense that they do not change during an organism’s lifetime: e.g. eating
(when the organism is hungry) is innately rewarding, from birth to death.
Hence, when the animal has learned how to systematically get to the reward
in a given context, the reinforcement signal will not fade away. This is the
reason why, with serial conditioned stimuli, the (unpredicted) appearance of
the earliest reward-predicting stimulus keeps on triggering phasic dopamine
(Schultz et al., 1993; Schultz, 1998). And this is why the same mechanisms
that allow the discovery and acquisition of novel actions can also drive the
learning of how to deploy acquired actions so to maximize rewards: since
biological rewards prevent that phasic dopamine fades away, the actions that
bring to them keep on being reinforced indefinitely, thus leading to reward
maximization. Note that the processes that make rewards “permanently
rewarding” and that prevent dopamine habituation do not need to involve
dopamine itself. Indeed, they might depend on the influences that rewards
have on physiological variables (like water or glucose concentrations in the
body) and work through the release of hormones or other neuromodulators.
Hence, what in experiments are considered as “unconditioned” rewards (e.g.
the sight or the taste of a food) may in fact be stimuli that have been con-
ditioned during the animal’s pre-experimental experience (as Schultz, 1998
suggests). What is important is that phasic stimuli that are predictive of bi-
ological rewards constitute permanent reinforcers, which can drive the max-
imization of reward through a TD-like learning process.
Our hypothesis is related to what psychologists have been calling intrinsic
motivations (White, 1959; Berlyne, 1960; Ryan and Deci, 2000; Baldassarre
and Mirolli, 2012). The concept of IM was introduced in the 1950s in animal
psychology to explain experimental phenomena (e.g. Harlow, 1950; Butler,
1953; Montgomery, 1954; Butler and Harlow, 1957) that were incompatible
with the Hullian theory of motivations as drives (Hull, 1943). In particular,
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what is most relevant here is that phasic stimuli not related to biological
rewards can be used to condition instrumental responses (Kish, 1955). Our
hypothesis explains this well documented phenomenon (Williams and Lowe,
1972; Glow and Winefield, 1978; Reed et al., 1996) by assuming that unpre-
dicted events represent intrinsic reinforcers that drive the same reinforcement
learning processes as extrinsic rewards.
3. Testing the hypothesis through a simulated robotic model
To sum up, our hypothesis states that phasic dopamine is a TD-like learn-
ing signal dependent on two kinds of reinforcers: (1) temporary, intrinsic
reinforcers, which drive the acquisition of a repertoire of actions; and (2)
permanent, extrinsic reinforcers, which drive the learning of when to deploy
acquired actions in order to maximize future rewards. The reason why ani-
mals need both kinds of reinforcers is that in real life the path that leads from
basic movements to the acquisition of biological rewards is often too long for
extrinsic reinforcers to su ce (Baldassarre, 2011). By helping the system to
acquire a repertoire of actions, intrinsic reinforcers dramatically simplify the
“search space” for the agent, and thus significantly facilitate the discovery
of the path that leads to biological rewards (see the “intrinsically motivated
reinforcement learning” framework proposed by Barto and collegues: Barto
et al., 2004; Singh et al., 2010; Barto, 2012 and developed also by ourselves:
Schembri et al., 2007c,b,a).
In order to test the computational soundness of our hypothesis we devel-
oped a simulated robotic set-up in which the acquisition of extrinsic rewards
depends on the deployment of a sequence of “actions” that must themselves
be learned. In such a set-up we show that extrinsic rewards alone are not
su cient to drive the reinforcement learning system, while adding intrin-
sic reinforcers dramatically facilitate reward acquisition. In order to ease
reading, in what follows we describe only the most relevant features of the
experiments whereas the details needed to replicate the simulations can be
found in the Appendix.
3.1. The task
The system is a simulated kinematic robot composed of a fixed head with
a mouth and a moving eye, and a two degrees of freedom kinematic arm
with a “hand” that can “grasp objects”. The task consists in learning to eat
food (i.e., bring a red object to the mouth) which is randomly placed on a
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rectangular table in front of the robot (fig.1). The task and the perceptual
system of the robot have been developed so that in order to eat the food the
robot must learn and deploy a sequence of actions that depend the one on
the other: since the arm controller is informed about food location through
what the eye sees, learning to systematically look at the food is a prerequisite
for learning to reach for it; similarly, reaching the food with the hand and
“grasping” it are necessary pre-conditions for bringing it to the mouth and
receiving the extrinsic reward.
The sensory system of the robot is composed by an artificial “retina”,
encoding the position of the hand and of the food with respect to the centre
of the visual field, a “fovea”, encoding whether the food is perceived in the
centre of the visual field (i.e. if the food and the position of the fovea sensor
are overlapping), the proprioception of the arm, encoding the angles of the
two arm joints, and a touch sensor encoding whether the hand is in contact
with the food (i.e, if the hand and the food are overlapping: collisions are
not simulated).
The motor system of the robot is composed by two outputs encoding the
displacements of the eye along the x and y axes, two outputs encoding the
changes in the angles of the two arm joints, and a single output encoding
whether grasping is performed or not (if the hand touches the food and the
grasping output is activated the food moves together with the hand).
3.2. The control architecture
The control system of the robot (figure 2) has been developed by follow-
ing general constraints that come both from the task and from the known
biology behind reinforcement learning in real animals. In particular, the con-
troller is composed of two sub-controllers, one for the eye and one for the
arm, reflecting the modular organization of the striato-cortical loops that are
known to subserve action selection and reinforcement learning (Doya, 2000;
Graybiel, 2005; Grahn et al., 2009; Redgrave et al., 2011), for which di↵erent
pathways subserve di↵erent e↵ectors (Romanelli et al., 2005).
Each subcontroller is implemented as an actor-critic reinforcement learn-
ing model (Barto et al., 1983; Sutton and Barto, 1998), as this architecture
can be considered as a good model of reinforcement learning in the basal
ganglia (Barto, 1995; Suri, 2002; Joel et al., 2002; Khamassi et al., 2005).
Both subcontrollers are trained through standard TD learning, reflecting the
hypothesis that the phasic dopaminergic signal represents the biological sub-
strate of the TD error (Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997). Furthermore,
10
Figure 1: Set up of the experiment: the system is composed by a two dimensional arm
and a moving eye (dotted square with a fovea at the centre). The task is to eat the food
that is randomly positioned on a table (grey rectangle), by bringing it to the mouth (small
rectangle in front of the robot’s face). See text and Appendix for details.
while there are di↵erent controllers for di↵erent e↵ectors, the reinforcement
learning signal is unique for all the controllers, in accordance with the fact
that the phasic DA signal is likely to be the same for all sensory-motor sub-
systems (Schultz, 2002).
Finally, the reinforcement depends not only on the extrinsic reward pro-
vided by eating the food, but also on intrinsic reinforcements provided by
the unexpected activations of the fovea and the touch sensors, in accordance
with the fact that unexpected events are able to trigger phasic dopamine
(Ljungberg et al., 1992; Horvitz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Horvitz, 2000).
For this purpose, the robot controller includes also two predictors, one for
the fovea sensor and one for the touch sensor. Each predictor is trained to
predict the activation of the corresponding sensor and inhibits the part of
the intrinsic reinforcement that depends on the activation of that sensor.
Hence, the total reinforcement (R) driving TD learning is composed by both
extrinsic and intrinsic reinforcements:
R = Re +Rf +Rt
where Re is the extrinsic reinforcement provided by eating the food (bringing
it to the mouth), and Rf and Rt are the intrinsic reinforcements provided by
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Figure 2: The controller, composed by the two sub-controllers (one for the arm and one
for the eye), and the reinforcement system, which includes two predictors, one for the
fovea sensor and one for the touch sensor. ↵ and   are the angles of the two arm joints;
x0 and y0 are the distances of the hand with respect to the centre of the fovea on the x
and y axes, respectively;  ↵ and    are the variations of angles ↵ and  , respectively,
as determined by the actor of the arm; Grs is the grasping output; Va is the evaluation
of the critic of the arm; x00 and y00 are the distances of the food with respect to the fovea
on the x and y axes, respectively,  x and  y are the displacements of the eye on the x
and y axes, respectively, as determined by the actor of the eye; Ve is the evaluation of the
critic of the eye; Pf and Pt are the predictions of the fovea and touch sensor predictors,
respectively; Af and At are the activations of the fovea and touch sensors, respectively;
Rf and Rt are the reinforcements related to foveating and touching the food, respectively;
Re is the reinforcement provided by eating the food; R is the total reinforcement. See text
and Appendix for details.
the unpredicted activations of, respectively, the fovea and the touch sensor:
RS = max[0;AS   PS]
where AS is the binary activation of sensor S (Af and At for the fovea and
the touch sensor, respectively) and PS is the prediction generated by the
predictor of sensor S (Pf and Pt, both in [0, 1], see appendix).
3.3. Experimental conditions
In order to test our hypothesis, we compare the condition just described
(which we call “intrinsic” condition) with two other conditions, in which we
vary the composition of the reinforcement signal. In the “extrinsic” condi-
tion the reinforcement is given only by the extrinsic reward for eating the
food (Re). The extrinsic condition serves to test whether in a situation that
requires the cumulative acquisition of di↵erent skills extrinsic reinforcements
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alone are su cient to drive learning. In the “sub-tasks” condition, the ad-
ditional reinforcements provided by the activations of the two sensors (Rf
and Rt) are also “permanent”, in the sense that they are not modulated by
the activities of the predictors and hence do not change throughout train-
ing (i.e the prediction PS of previous equation is always 0). This condition
serves to investigate whether the temporary nature of intrinsic reinforcement
is important for facilitating learning.
3.4. Results
Each experiment lasts 500000 trials. At the beginning of each trial the
food is positioned randomly on the table, the joint angles of the arm are
randomly initialized so that the hand is also on the table but does not touch
the food, and the eye center is randomly positioned inside the table so that
it does not look at the food. A trial terminates if food is eaten, if it falls
o↵ the table (i.e. if the food is outside the table and not “grasped”), or
after a time-out of 40 time-steps. Every 500 trials we perform 50 test trials
(where learning is switched o↵) during which we record useful statistics of
the system’s behavior. All reported data represent the average results of ten
replications of each experiment with random initial conditions.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of test trials in which the robot eats the
food in the three experimental conditions as a function of learning time.
After 500000 trails the performance in the extrinsic condition is still below
20% (see figure 4a): as predicted, the extrinsic reinforcement is so di cult
and unlikely to be reached that it is not able to drive the learning of the
system, and, in particular, the learning of the sub-skills that are required
to get to the reward (consider that the system is not guaranteed to learn
the task even with infinite time since due to their partial sensory systems
the problem for the two sub-controllers is non-markovian: see appendix for
details).
In the sub-tasks condition, at the end of learning the robot eats the food
in 80% of the test trials. Adding reinforcements for foveating and touching
the food highly improves performance because it greatly facilitates the acqui-
sition of the necessary sub-skills (fig. 4b): first, the eye learns to look at the
food, and then the arm learns to touch and grasp it, which is a prerequisite
for learning to eat. Notice that when the system has learned to reach for
the food and grasp it, the time spent by the eye on the target diminishes, as
indicated by the lowering of the reinforcements provided by the activation
of the fovea sensor: the reason is that for architectural limits the eye is not
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Figure 3: Percentage of test trials in which the robot eats the food throughout learning
in the three experimental conditions (Extrinsic, Sub-Tasks, Intrinsic).
able to follow the food while the hand is grasping and moving it (the eye
controller is not informed about the movements of the arm).
The intrinsic condition is the one in which performance increases most
fastly and reaches the highest level (about 90%). The reason is that the
reinforcements provided by the unpredicted activations of the sensors are
ideally suited for driving the cumulative acquisition of a sequence of skills
thanks to their temporal character. In this condition the reinforcements
provided by the activations of the fovea and of the touch sensors rapidly grow
as the related abilities (of foveating and reaching the food, respectively) are
being acquired. But as the system learns to systematically foveate and touch
the food, the related predictors also learn to predict the activations of the
sensors, thus making the intrinsic reinforcements fade away (figure 4c). In
this way, once a skill has been acquired the related reinforcement does not
influence learning any more, and the system can focus on learning the next
skill on the basis of its relative reinforcement.
At this point it is important to understand whether the results we have
found really depend on the di↵erent experimental conditions or just on the
particular quantitative relation between the value of intrinsic and the ex-
trinsic reinforcements that we used. In order to check this we run again
the experiment for all the three conditions varying the value of the extrin-
sic reinforcement provided by eating the food (from 5 to 30: much lower or
higher values did not permit to any condition to learn the task). Figure 5
shows the average final performance (after 500000 trials) of ten repetitions
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Figure 4: Average percentage of test trials in which the robot performs the sub-tasks
(Look, Touch) in the three conditions: Extrinsic (a), Sub-Tasks (b) and Intrinsic (c). (d)
zooms-in the first 100000 trials of the intrinsic condition. (b), (c) and (d) also show the
average reinforcements related to the activation of the fovea sensor (Rf) and the touch
sensor (Rt). Note that since the maximum reinforcements for each time step for foveation
and touch are 1, in the Sub-Tasks condition at the end of learning the system foveates
food about 50% of time steps and touches it about 35%.
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Figure 5: Average final performance (percentage of trials in which the system eats the
food) of the three conditions (Extrinsic, Sub-Tasks and Intrinsic) as a function of the
value of the extrinsic reinforcement (Re).
for each condition. The figure demonstrates that the results do not depend
on the quantitative relation between the value of the intrinsic and extrinsic
reinforcements: apart for Re = 5, where only the intrinsic condition reaches
good performance, for any value of the extrinsic reinforcement the extrin-
sic condition never learns to solve the task, whereas the intrinsic and the
sub-task conditions reach comparable high performance.
Hence, while the results of the extrinsic condition clearly show that ex-
trinsic reinforcements are not su cient by themselves to drive the maximiza-
tion of rewards in this set-up, the comparable results of the sub-tasks and
the intrinsic conditions do not support our hypothesis regarding the impor-
tance of the temporal character of additional reinforcements. However, this
may be due to a peculiar and un-realistic characteristic of the present set-up:
additional reinforcements are given only for reaching those states that are
required for getting to the final reward. In sharp contrast with this, for real
organisms it is not possible to know a priori which are the actions needed for
getting closer to biological rewards and which are not. Importantly, if all the
changes that an organism can make in the environment would be permanently
reinforcing, then the animal would easily get stuck in producing irrelevant
events without passing on and eventually discover how to maximize biologi-
cal rewards. It is the temporary nature of intrinsic reinforcements given by
unexpected events that let organisms acquire a repertoire of actions, while
freeing the animal from compulsively deploying those actions in case they do
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not directly lead to rewards. In order to show this, we need a slightly more
realistic set-up in which not all reinforced events are relevant for obtaining
reward.
4. A more realistic test: adding a distractor
4.1. Modifications of the set-up, architecture and learning signal
In order to test our idea that the temporary character of intrinsic rein-
forcements is necessary for preventing the system to get stuck in producing
actions that are not relevant for the acquisition of rewards, we modified the
set-up by simply adding another object on the table, which can be seen but
not touched nor grasped, and which is not related to the final reward (figure
6a). The new object, which can be considered as a “distractor” with respect
to the goal of eating the food, has a di↵erent “colour” with respect to the
food (i.e. the two objects are visually detected by di↵erent sensors) and is
always positioned in the middle of the table (which make the task more di -
cult because the distractor is more easily encountered than the food; we run
also simulations with the distractor randomly positioned on the table and
the results are almost identical).
With respect to the control system, the only modification that had to be
done with respect to the previous scenario was to duplicate the visual system
(of both the eye controller and of the fovea predictor) so that it can detect,
with di↵erent sensors, the two objects: the food (red) and the distractor
(blue) (figure 6b).
Finally, also the component of the reinforcement signal that depends on
the activation of the fovea is duplicated as foveating the distractor (blue
object) is reinforcing just as foveating the food (red object). As in the previ-
ous set-up, in the intrinsic condition intrinsic reinforcements are temporary
as they depend on the unpredicted activations of the fovea and touch sen-
sors, while in the sub-task condition additional reinforcements are permanent
as they are not inhibited by predictors. The reinforcement of the extrinsic
condition does not change, as it depends only on bringing the food to the
mouth.
4.2. Results
Figure 7 shows the performance of the three experimental conditions in
the new scenario. In the extrinsic condition the distractor does not influ-
ence the reinforcement learning system. As a consequence, the results are
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Fovea Food
Distractor
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Di↵erences of the second set-up with respect to the first one. (a) A “distractor”,
which can be seen but not touched, is added in the middle of the table. (b) Di↵erences in
the control system. Both the eye controller (left) and the fovea predictor (right) have been
duplicated: they have two sets of receptors, each sensible to one of the objects (red food
and blue distractor). Furthermore, also the fovea sensor and the relative component of
the reinforcement signal have been duplicated, one for the unpredicted activation caused
by the food and one for that caused by the distractor.
substantially similar to those obtained in the previous experiment, with a
final performance of about 15%. This confirms the conclusion that extrinsic
rewards alone are not su cient to drive the learning of the skills that are
necessary for eating food.
The comparison between the sub-tasks and the intrinsic conditions is
more interesting. Whereas in the first experimental set-up the performance
of the two conditions were comparable, the addition of the second object
disrupts the performance of the sub-tasks condition (10%) while leaving sub-
stantially unchanged that of the intrinsic condition (about 85%).
To understand why this is so we have to look at data regarding the be-
havior of the eye in the two conditions (figure 8). In the sub-tasks condition
(figure 8a), the robot rapidly learns to foveate the distractor, because it is
always in the same position in the middle of the table and so it is easier to
learn to look at it than to look at the food. The problem is that, since foveat-
ing the distractor is permanently reinforcing, the robot keeps on looking at
it indefinitely, and never learns to look at the food. As a consequence, the
robot does not learn to reach and grasp the food, which is a prerequisite for
learning to bring it to the mouth.
Also in the intrinsic condition (fig.8b) the robot starts by looking at the
distractor, but after the ability to foveate it has been learned, the activation
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Figure 7: Performance (percentage of test trials in which the robot eats the food) of the
three experimental conditions in the second set-up, containing the distractor
of the fovea sensor that is sensitive to the blue object (the distractor) starts to
be predicted by the corresponding predictor, which rapidly makes this event
no more reinforcing. As a result, the robot can discover that also foveating
the food can be reinforcing and so starts acquiring this second ability. Even
the reinforcement given by foveating the food fades aways as soon as the skill
is acquired and the activation of the fovea is predictable, but the robot never
stops producing this behaviour because it leads to the acquisition of other
reinforcements: first the temporary ones that depend on touching the food,
and then the permanent, extrinsic ones provided by bringing the food to the
mouth. Notice that as the robot learns to eat the food, the number of times
the robot looks at the distractor increases again. This is due to the same
architectural constraints that decreased the percentage of time spent by the
eye on the food in the first experimental scenario: as the food is grasped and
moved towards the mouth, the lack of information about the arm movement
of the eye controller does not allow it to follow the food. As a result, the
eye resorts to the behavior that it had previously learned, i.e. foveating the
distractor.
These results seem to confirm our hypothesis regarding the necessity of
the temporal character of intrinsic reinforcements, but we need to check
whether the results depend on the quantitative relation between value of the
intrinsic and extrinsic reinforcements, as done for the first set-up. Figure
9 shows the average final performance of ten repetitions for each condition
as a function of the value of the extrinsic reinforcement (Re). The results
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Figure 8: Behavior of the eye in the second set-up (with distractor) for the Sub-Tasks (a)
condition and the Intrinsic condition (b). Average percentage of test trials in which the
eye foveates the food (L Food) and the other object (L Other) and average reinforcements
per step generated by the activations of the two sensors (R Food and R Other)
clearly show that irrespective of the value of the extrinsic reward, the intrinsic
condition is the only one that reaches high performance. Indeed, in all cases
the sub-task condition reaches a performance that is even lower than that
of the extrinsic condition, demonstrating that if one cannot know which
events will lead closer to biological rewards (which is what happens for real
organisms), permanently reinforcing all events is not only useless, but can
even be deleterious. Only intrinsic reinforcements given by unexpected events
are able to drive the cumulative acquisition of all the skills that are necessary
for learning to maximize extrinsic rewards.
5. Discussion
The current debate over the role of phasic dopamine is split in two op-
posing views: the received wisdom, supported by a great number of empir-
ical findings, holds that dopamine is a reward prediction error that drives
animals to learn how to deploy actions in order to maximize biological re-
wards (e.g. Schultz, 2002; Ungless, 2004; Wise, 2004; Doya, 2007; Graybiel,
2008; Glimcher, 2011); an alternative position, based on di↵erent empirical
evidences, holds that dopamine is a sensory prediction error that drives ac-
tion discovery and acquisition (Redgrave and Gurney, 2006; Redgrave et al.,
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Figure 9: Average final performance on the eating task in the second experimental scenario
of the three conditions (Extrinsic, Sub-Tasks and Intrinsic) as a function of the value of
the extrinsic reinforcement (Ret) provided by eating the food. See text for details.
2008, 2011, 2012). Each hypothesis is insu cient in that it is not able to
account for the data on which the other hypothesis is based: the reward
prediction error hypothesis does not explain why dopamine is triggered also
by unexpected events not related to rewards; the sensory prediction error
hypothesis does not explain why dopamine corresponds so strictly to the TD
reward prediction error postulated by computational reinforcement learning.
In this paper we have proposed an original hypothesis that reconciles these
two opposing views and thus is able to account for both kinds of empirical
evidence on which the two views are based. According to our proposal pha-
sic dopamine is a TD-like reinforcement prediction error signal in a learning
system that is driven by two kinds of reinforcements: intrinsic, temporary
reinforcements provided by unexpected events, and extrinsic, permanent re-
inforcements provided by biological rewards. As such, dopamine plays both
functions: temporary reinforcements drive the discovery and acquisition of
new actions, whereas permanent reinforcements drive the maximization of re-
wards. We have tested this hypothesis with a series of experiments involving
a simulated robotic system that in order to get rewards has to cumulatively
acquire di↵erent skills. The results showed that, if not all the possible skills
that can be acquired directly lead to reward, only a system that receives
intrinsic temporary reinforcements in addiction to the extrinsic ones is able
to learn the task, thus supporting our hypothesis.
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Kakade and Dayan (2002) had tried to reconcile the reward prediction
error hypothesis with the fact that dopamine is also triggered by stimuli not
related to reward by assuming that such dopamine activations constitute nov-
elty bonuses whose function is to increase animal exploration. Our proposal
di↵ers from that of Kakade and Dayan with respect to both the function and
the mechanism of reward-unrelated dopamine activations. With respect to
the function, our proposal holds that reward-unrelated dopamine activations
have the function of driving action discovery and acquisition (as in Redgrave
and colleagues’ theory) and not of enhancing exploration (as suggested by
Kakade and Dayane: see also Fellous and Suri, 2003). Our view is sup-
ported by the long accepted evidence that unpredicted events can be used as
reinforcers for training instrumental actions (e.g. Kish, 1955; Williams and
Lowe, 1972; Glow and Winefield, 1978; Reed et al., 1996). With respect
to the mechanism, according to our view dopamine is triggered by unex-
pected events (i.e. unpredicted changes of state), and not by the novelty of
the presented stimuli (i.e. states). Even though in the literature dopamine
activations triggered by stimuli not associated with rewards have been de-
scribed as novelty responses (see, e.g. Schultz, 1998), in all experiments that
we know about phasic dopamine is triggered by events (i.e. onset and/or
o↵set of stimuli), and not by stimuli alone, be they novel or familiar. The
same is true for the behavioral experiments showing that sensory events (and
not novel stimuli) are able to drive the acquisition of instrumental responses.
Indeed, given that most of these experiments use the simple switching on of
a light as the dopamine triggering stimulus (or as the reinforcer), it seems
plausible that what really matters is the unpredictability of the event, rather
than the novelty of the stimulus itself, since it is di cult to consider the light
as a novel stimulus. In fact, at least in behavioral experiment with rats, it
has been shown that prior exposure to the light that is used to condition
operant responses does not significantly a↵ect the reinforcing e↵ect of the
light (Russell and Glow, 1974), as would be predicted by our hypothesis that
it is the unpredictability of the event, rather than its novelty, that triggers
phasic dopamine and reinforces behavior.
According to our hypothesis the phasic dopaminergic bursts determined
by reward-unrelated unpredicted events constitute (part of) the neural sub-
strate of intrinsic motivations: in particular, they represent the TD-error
generated by intrinsic reinforcers. This hypothesis predicts also that, whereas
the responses conditioned through biological rewards will be maintained be-
cause of the permanent nature of extrinsic reinforcers, the responses condi-
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tioned through phasic events alone in the long term will tend to fade away
because of the temporary nature of intrinsic reinforcers: once the action of
“light switching” has been learned, the appearance of the light becomes pre-
dictable, hence the light switching stops to activate phasic dopamine and
to reinforce the action, which makes the behavior extinguish. This predic-
tion is confirmed by behavioral experiments with rats: it is well documented
that the number of responses conditioned through intrinsic reinforcements
do decline with prolonged training (e.g. Roberts et al., 1958; Carlton, 1966;
Russell and Glow, 1974).
The task and experimental set-up that we used for validating our hy-
pothesis were rather simple and and somewhat artificial. It is important to
consider that our experiments were not intended to model how humans learn
to foveate, reach, and bring objects to the mouth, nor to demonstrate the
computational power of the model that we used. Rather, the model has to be
considered just as a proof of concept that the hypothesis we have proposed
on the mechanisms and functional roles of phasic dopamine in real brains
is computationally sound. In particular, that a system that is reinforced by
both permanent extrinsic reinforcements and temporary intrinsic ones pro-
vided by unexpected events is able to cumulatively acquire complex skills
that are very di cult to acquire on the basis of only the final reinforcements,
and that the temporary nature of intrinsic reinforcements, that is the fact
that they fade away as the system’s learning proceeds, is pivotal for letting
the system stop performing a skill once it has been acquired and if it doesn’t
lead to reward. One aspect of our set-up that is particularly critical is that we
had to use predictors that were specifically designed to learn just the events
that we planned to be significant: foveating objects and touching them. The
main reason for this is that we had to keep the set-up simple enough that
simulations could be computationally feasible in a reasonable period of time.
Real organisms have much more computational resources and can take days,
months and even years to learn a skill, so they can a↵ord much less specific
predictors as our own. However, it is important to note that the second
set-up, with the distractor, was specifically intended to demonstrate that,
contrary to what happens if the system does not receive temporary intrinsic
reinforcements, for it to work it is not necessary that only the events that
lead to reward are reinforcing. Hence, we contend that a process of cumu-
lative acquisition of skills as the one demonstrated by our model (but much
more powerful) should be present even in organisms, for which, we assume,
any kind of unpredicted event is reinforcing. From the computational point
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of view, we still do not know how to design powerful, general purpose event
predictors, nor powerful controllers that may permit real open-ended skill
learning. In this respect, the development of more sophisticated models is
an important challenge for future computational research.
While the empirical evidence clearly shows that the phasic dopamine
that is triggered by neutral events is temporary, the presence of predictors
that learn to anticipate these events and thus inhibit dopamine release is an
assumption of our model (a similar hypothesis has been made also by Red-
grave et al., 2011). However, strictly speaking it is not even necessary that
the temporary character of intrinsic reinforcement depend on event predic-
tors for our general hypothesis on the functional roles of dopamine to hold.
It may be that other processes, like for example sensory habituation, are
involved. What is crucial for our hypothesis is that the events that at the
beginning trigger phasic dopamine stop to do so after a while, which has
been consistently reported in the literature. Independently from which is
the reason for this, our hypothesis states (and our model confirms) that this
temporary nature of intrinsic reinforcements serves the critical function of
letting the system learn new actions and then pass to learn other things.
Recently, the topic of intrinsic motivations has been gaining increasing
interest in the robotics and machine learning communities (Schmidhuber,
1991a,b; Huang and Weng, 2002; Kaplan and Oudeyer, 2003; Barto et al.,
2004; Oudeyer et al., 2007; Uchibe and Doya, 2008; Lee et al., 2009; Bal-
dassarre and Mirolli, 2012). The idea of using a sensory prediction error as
an intrinsic reinforcement has been firstly proposed by Schmidhuber (1991a)
and used in various subsequent models (e.g. Huang and Weng, 2002). In par-
ticular, the model probably more similar to ours is that proposed by Barto
et al. (2004), where intrinsic reinforcements are given by the error in the pre-
diction of salient events. The most important di↵erence between Barto and
colleagues’ work and our own lies in the aims of the research: while Barto et
al. took inspiration from biology to develop more e cient artificial systems,
the goal of the present work is purely scientific, that is to propose a new hy-
pothesis that reconciles the two opponent theories on phasic dopamine and
accounts for all the available empirical evidence. This fundamental di↵erence
in perspective led to several di↵erences in the details of the model’s archi-
tecture: while Barto et al. use options (Sutton et al., 1999), a very powerful
hierarchical reinforcement learning framework, we use plain reinforcement
learning; while they use intra-option learning methods in which each skill
has its own learning signal, in our system the reinforcement learning signal
24
is unique for all the controllers, as in the brain phasic DA is likely to be
the same for all sensory-motor subsystems (Schultz, 2002); while they use
option probabilistic models, we use simple event predictors; while they use
Q-Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), we use the actor-critic architecture,
which be considered as a good model of reinforcement learning in the basal
ganglia (Barto, 1995; Suri, 2002; Joel et al., 2002; Khamassi et al., 2005).
Although using sensory prediction errors as intrinsic reinforcements has a
relatively long history in computational work, Schmidhuber (1991b) pointed
out that a pure sensory prediction error might not be a good reinforcement
signal as it would create problems when the environment is unpredictable: in
such cases, the reinforcement provided by the prediction error would never
decrease and the system would get stuck in trying to reproduce unpredictable
outcomes. To avoid this problem, the use of the progress in predictions was
proposed as a better intrinsic reinforcement, a solution that has been adopted
also in developmental robotic systems (e.g. Oudeyer et al., 2007). In contrast
to this, the experimental data on phasic dopamine, and the hypothesis that
we propose for explaining those data, seem to show that the intrinsic rein-
forcement signals that drive action learning depend on unpredicted events,
not on progress in predictions. How could the problem of getting stuck on
unpredictable events be solved? We think that a possible solution might de-
pend on the presence of other motivational mechanisms working at an higher
level of the hierarchical organization of behavior. In particular, if we assume
that there is a level at which organisms decide what to learn and when (which
skill to train in each context), intrinsic reinforcements given to this part of
the learning system and based on the learning progress in skill acquisition
(as the ones used in Schembri et al., 2007a,b,c; see also Stout and Barto,
2010) would solve the problem of unpredictability: if there are no skills to
acquire due to the unpredictability of events, the reinforcement provided by
competence progress will be zero, and the system will move forward and try
to learn something else. While the presence of competence-based intrinsic
motivations has been variously postulated in the psychological literature (e.g.
White, 1959; De Charms, 1968; Glow and Winefield, 1978; Csikszentmihalyi,
1991), the identification of their possible biological implementation remains
a fundamental open issue for future research (for a more detailed discussion
of this point, see Mirolli and Baldassarre, 2012).
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Appendix A. Computational details of the experiments
Here we provide all the details that are necessary to reproduce the simu-
lations described in the paper.
The visual field of the robot is a square of 14 units per size. The arm of the
robot is composed of two segments which are 4 units long. The food is a circle
with 0.3 units diameter. In the second set of experiments, the “distractor”
is a circle with a diameter of 0.4. The table is a rectangle measuring 4 and
7 units.
For all the inputs we use population coding through Gaussian radial basis
functions (RBF) (Pouget and Snyder, 2000):
ai = e
 Pd( cd cid2 2
d
)2
where ai is the activation of input unit i, cd is the input value of dimension d,
cid is the preferred value of unit i with respect to dimension d, and  2d is the
width of the Gaussian along dimension d (widths are parametrized so that
when the input is equidistant, along a given dimension, to two contiguous
neurons, their activation is 0.5).
The dimensions of the input to the eye controller are the position of the
object (x and y) relative to the centre of the visual field (the fovea) and the
activation of the touch sensor. The preferred object positions of input units
are uniformly distributed on a 7x7 grid with ranges [-7; 7], which, multiplied
by the binary activation of the touch sensor, forms a total grid of 7x7x2. In
the second experiment, the input to the eye controller is formed by two 7x7x2
grids, one for the red object (food) and one for the blue object (distractor).
The dimensions of the input to the arm controller are the angles of the
two joints (↵ and  ), the position of the hand (x and y) with respect to
the fovea, and the activation of th touch sensor. The preferred joint angles
of input units are uniformly distributed on a 7x7 grid ranging in [0; 180]
whereas the preferred positions of the hand with respect to the fovea are
uniformly distributed on a 7x7 grid with ranges [-7; 7]. Hence, considering
the binary activation of the touch sensor, the total grid of the input to the
arm is formed by 7x7x7x7x2 units.
The two sub-controllers (of the eye and of the arm) are neural network
implementations of the actor-critic architecture (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
adapted to work with continuous states and actions spaces (Doya, 2000;
Schembri et al., 2007a), in discrete time.
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The input units of the eye controller are fully connected to two output
units with sigmoidal activation:
oj =  (bj +
NX
i
aiwji)  (x) =
1
1 + e x
where bj is the bias of output unit j, N is the number of input units, and
wji is the weight of the connection linking input unit i to output unit j.
Each output unit controls the displacement of the eye along one dimension.
Each actual motor command onj is generated by adding some noise to the
activation of the relative output unit:
onj = oj + r
where r is a random value uniformly drawn in [0.02; 0.02]. The resulting
command (in [0; 1]) is remapped in [-8, 8] and determines the displacement
of the eye ( x and  y).
The arm controller has three output units. Two have sigmoidal activation,
as those of the eye, with noise uniformly distributed in [-0.2; 0.2]. Each
resulting motor command, remapped in [-25; 25] degrees, determines the
change of one joint angle ( ↵ and   , respectively). The third output unit
has binary activation {0; 1}, and controls the grasping action (The binary
activation of the third output is determined by the sigmoidal activation of
the output unit plus a random noise uniformly drawn in [-0.2; 0.2], with a
threshold set to 0.5).
The evaluation of the critic of each sub-controller k (Vk) is a linear com-
bination of the weighted sum of the respective input units:
Vk =
NkX
i
akiwki
Learning depends on the TD reinforcement learning algorithm (Sutton
and Barto, 1998), where the TD error  k of each sub-controller k is calculated
as:
 k = (R
t +  kV
t
k )  V t 1k
where Rt is the reinforcement at time step t, V tk is the evaluation of the critic
of controller k at time step t, and  k is the discount factor, set to 0.9 for
both the eye and the arm controllers. The extrinsic reinforcement provided
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by bringing the food to the mouth is 15 in all the conditions of the first
experiment. In order to avoid that the system tries to perform grasping even
when the hand is not close to the food, the activation of the grasping output
(for each time step) is slightly punished with a negative reinforcement of
0.0001.
The weight wki of input unit i of critic k is updated in the standard way:
 wki = ⌘
c
k kaki
where ⌘ck is the learning rate, set to 0.02 for both the eye and the arm
controllers.
The weights of actor k are updated as follows:
 wkji = ⌘
a
k k(o
n
kj   okj)(okj(1  okj))aki
where ⌘ak is the learning rate (set to 0.2 for both the eye and the arm con-
troller), onkj   okj is the ’error signal’ (the produced noisy action minus the
action chosen by the network before adding noise), and okj(1   okj) is the
derivative of the sigmoid function.
Also the input of the predictors is composed of RBF units. The input
of the fovea sensor predictor is formed by two 35x35 grids, each encoding
the position of the object with respect to the fovea along one axis (x and y,
respectively), and the programmed displacement of the eye along the same
axis ( x and  y, respectively). Similarly, the input of the touch sensor pre-
dictor is formed by two 35x35 grids, each encoding the position of hand with
respect to the object along one axis and the programmed displacement of
the hand along the same axis. All preferred input are uniformly distributed
in the range [-7; 7] for object positions and [-25; 25] for displacements. The
output of each predictor is a single sigmoidal unit with activation in [0; 1]
receiving connections from all the predictor’s input units.
Event predictors are trained through a TD learning algorithm (for a gen-
eralization of TD learning to general predictions, see Sutton and Tanner,
2005). For each predictor p, the TD error  p is calculated as follows:
 p = (A
t
S +  pP
t
S)  P t 1S
where AtS is the activation of sensor S (fovea or touch sensor) at time step
t, P tS is the prediction relative to sensor S at time step t, and  p is the
predictors’ discount factor, set to 0.7.
28
Finally, the weights of predictor p, are updated as follow:
 wpi = ⌘
c
p papi
where ⌘cp is the learning rate, set to 0.00008. Low values for predictors’
gammas and learning rates prevent that predictors inhibit the intrinsic rein-
forcement too early, in particular before the system has acquired the relative
skills. We have discussed more principled solutions to this potential problem
in Santucci et al. (2012).
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